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VOL. 28, NO. 09, Nov 14 , 2008 (Kartik 29 2065 B.S.)
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Emergence of New Constitutional Jurisprudence in Post-conflict Societies
By Surya Dhungel
Noam Chomsky's critical remarks against a 'march on a glorious future,' in a theme dedicated to bringing justice and freedom to a suffering world, that resurrected the idea of a "driving passion for democracy promotion," strongly objects international interventions in the internal affairs of many developing countries. However, this has been under the terms of the universally applied 'doctrine of necessity' and 'righteous exceptionalism'. These doctrines, with the support of the world community, have tacitly legitimized external invasion in the area of national sovereignty and helped stretch international jurisdictions to the constitutional regimes of many 'soft-states'. This is seen especially in post-conflict societies and in cases where the state institutions of a country have failed to provide the minimum human security.
In the name of preventing social atrocities, providing human security, restoring peace, and establishing the rule of law and democratic order, new measures have been put into place by soft-states for inviting external help to address internal problems. As a result, existing conceptual barriers of traditional constitutionalism have evolved in many countries, thereby paving a path for the gradual emergence of new constitutional jurisprudence in processes of conflict resolution and negotiations for peace and constitution building. Cambodia in 1991, the recent cases of Afghanistan, East Timor Iraq and Liberia are examples of the global acceptance of such a phenomena. Present day Nepal also represents the changing dynamics of constitutional jurisprudence.
Modern constitution-making, as an essential tool for a 'fresh start' towards restoring sustainable peace, institutionalizing an inclusive democratic order and providing social justice to hitherto excluded communities, especially in post-conflict societies, is a complex process. In light of the traditional elite-driven processes of drafting new constitutions, more emphasis has now been placed on public participation and engagement of interest groups in the framing process to ensure ownership of the people in the Constitution. Since the constitution-making process provides a forum for constant negotiations amongst the competing, and sometime warring, political forces to arrive at a consensual agreement in a constitution's text, which could serve as the basic law of the land, new innovative mechanisms have been initiated in recent times to promote public consultations as well as openly receive technical inputs from experts. The elected Constituent Assembly of Nepal is inducting such devices through the 'Rules of Constituent Assembly Procedure' in order to make the constitutional process participatory and inclusive.
This paper attempts to analyse some emerging trends of constitutional development in young democracies which have become instrumental in diluting the traditional concepts of constitutional jurisprudence- due to their failure to respond to and include the aspirations and demands of the people. The habit of merely creating new institutions and enacting constitutional principles in a Constitution without the people understanding their basic rights and their inability to relate constitutional provisions to their own day-to-day lives, has proved an insufficient strategy to rouse people's ownership. New methodologies in post-conflict constitution-making exercises have been an integral part of peace building processes in the modern world. Developing jurisdictions and new concepts that exceed the customary boundaries of classical constitutionalism, in both substantive and procedural terms, are outlined in the following note.
Evolving Jurisdictions
During the colonial era, the occupying foreign powers were able to impose their respective norms of constitutionalism directly through changes in legal systems and traditional institutions. A blend of multiple legal values can therefore still be found to prevail in many countries after decades of independence. The influence of foreign legal systems is quite visible in present day India, South Africa, Cambodia and Liberia, each of which have borrowed legal concepts and standards in their processes of constitution building. After national independence or a negotiated regime change, several countries, including USA, India and South Africa, have tried to indoctrinate their own 'home-grown' constitutional jurisprudence under the veil of 'autochthony', mainly through elected assemblies.
Such influences are more dominant in the justice sector through judicial activism, with the use of 'judicial interpretism' as a tool. This concept emerged long ago under a common law culture as a universally accepted tool even to internalize foreign concepts of legal jurisprudence while delivering justice and securing citizens' rights within national boundaries. Systemic constitutional conventions and practices have received global recognition and sufficient space, both in newly drafted or amended constitutional texts and referential judgments in courts of law. In response to modern challenges and societal demands, new innovations to introduce constitutional reforms through both legislative and judicial means have helped restructure antiquated state institutions, and further modified traditional political systems even in matured democracies.
In the modern world, international treaties and conventions have not only reshaped the governance model of many countries, such as member states of the European Union, with their common parliament and court, but voluntarily allowed the expansion of UN and international jurisdictions in both human rights regimes and the governance sector. The system of 'UN Governance,' through peace accords and Security Council resolutions, has changed the dynamics of boundary-based 'traditional sovereignty' and allowed the expansion of 'governance legitimacy' by creating new devices, especially in post-conflict failing states. On 23 October 1991, representatives of 21 countries met in Paris for a conference held in the presence of the UN Secretary General and decided: 'The Signatories invite the United Nations Security Council to establish a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (hereinafter referred to as "UNTAC") with civilian and military components under the direct responsibility of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. For this purpose the Secretary-General will designate a Special Representative to act on his behalf.' 'UN governance' thus gave birth to a new type of constitutional process.
Professor Yash Pal Ghai, while speaking at a gathering of Nepali elites at a seminar about the causes of constitutional failures in countries, tried to analyse the effect of globalization on the 'modern constitution.' He highlighted the growing interconnectedness of global economic transactions as a reason for evolving jurisdictions. Due to globalization, according to him, power has shifted from national frontiers to international institutions, regional organizations, international corporations and international markets. Reinforcing this view, World Bank President Robert Zoeliick recently stated, 'the events of September and October 2008 could be a tipping point for many developing countries... as always, the poor are the most defenceless'. He further added, "We cannot turn the clock on globalization...fate presents an opportunity wrapped in a necessity: to modernize multilateralism and markets."
'In fact we are not in control of our destiny," Professor Ghai claims, "and yet we are making constitutions, for the most part, on the assumption of an old type of sovereignty, where we would be truly in control of our destiny."
New Constitutional Jurisprudence
The first paradigm shift in the regime of constitutional jurisprudence, noticed by many legal scholars as early as the nineties, was in areas of political constitutionalism and governance. In place of a national Constitution as a supreme legal instrument of governance, a separate charter, in the form of an 'Agreement on Comprehensive Political Settlement' was developed in Paris on 23 October 1991, based on a 'framework document' (of 28 August 1990) was agreed upon entirely by Cambodian parties, and later endorsed by the UN Security Council and General Assembly in September and October 1990, through respective resolutions 668 and 45/3. This 'Agreement' of 23 October 1991, signed by Cambodia in Paris as one of 21 parties, was the supreme governing document for Cambodia until it produced a new Constitution in 1993 through a Constituent Assembly. The ultimate source of sovereign authority, or 'rule of recognition' in Professor Hart's terms, was accepted in a Supreme National Council formed on 10 September 1990 in Jakarta, to be chaired later by Prince Norodom Sihnouk. Sole responsibility of governance in the country, during the interim phase of political transition between 1991 and 1993, was entrusted to the UN-appointed Transitional Authority (UNTAC), led by a foreign national. UNTAC's additional role was to ensure the fair conduct of Constituent Assembly elections for Cambodia and assist in the drafting of a new Constitution.
Other countries have received similar assistance from bodies like the UN and other international communities, such as ECOWAS and African Union in the case of African nations. Interesting examples of constitutional development can be taken from the experiences of these countries. New constitutional norms, taking shape during a country's peace building process, may include:
Replacement of a national Constitution by 'peace accord' for transition, and in some cases subordinated by Transitional Authority Law, for the governance of a country during the transitional period until a new Constitution has been drafted, as was done in cases of Cambodia, Afghanistan, East Timor and Iraq. Parties to such agreements (or peace accords) in many cases are representatives of foreign governments, international agencies, United Nations, and in some cases civil society. A USIP/UNDP study shows, since 1975 nearly 200 new constitutions have appeared in countries at risk of international violence. Internationally brokered peace accords have entailed the developments of new constitutions in the Balkans, Cambodia, East Timor, Rwanda, Chad, Mozambique, and the Comoros. New fundamental laws have been featured in the adoption of competitive political systems from Albania to Zambia.
Legitimization of an agreement (peace accord) prepared abroad as a vehicle to partially suspend or amend a national Constitution for establishing transitional government. In time of crisis or profound change, when the existing Constitution may not provide sufficient guidance, the process opens with deliberations about the appropriate format for subsequent arrangements. These cases include regime-changing amendments and formulation of interim constitutions. Out of 194 cases of Constitution drafting between 1975 and 2003, one third of the countries have opted for an Interim Constitution as a transitional arrangement, and some have permitted a charter (Peace Accord) to be a basis for interim governance. With an objective of resolving disputes and establishing peace, Accra Accord on Liberia was signed in August 2003 on the initiative of ECOWAS and The African Union to suspend relevant provisions of the existing Constitution related to the Legislature and Executive branches. For the transitional period an interim unicameral legislature was formed along with a cabinet based on the consensus of the signatories and leading political forces, such as Government of Liberia (GOL), Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and other parties. With regard to the Judiciary, however, organizational structure was left unchanged. But justices of all courts were terminated, and arrangements for recruiting new ones were made with the Liberian Bar Association heading the committee for vetting.
Recognition of Security Council resolutions, with or without the request and consent of the host country concerned, as a basis of intervention for constitutional changes or monitoring of the peace process by UN. In the case of Iraq for example, UN involvement was not based on the request of the forcefully dislodged government.
Grant of supervisory and legitimizing authority to the UN for national elections as well as for monitoring the management of arms and armies. While the UN in Cambodia and East Timor was responsible for administering and legitimizing the elections of Constituent Assemblies, in other countries, including Liberia and Nepal, it was the National Election Commission that took up the task of administering national elections. UN in these countries was merely a monitoring body which provided technical support upon request. However, big armies of international and national observers were present in most countries in recent times in the name of ensuring fairness in elections. Impacts of such election observations are occasionally found negative and adversely help to legitimize the state-sponsored, and sometime state-ignored, intimidations. UN reports on Cambodian elections and EU reports on Nepal's recent Constituent Assembly election may be cited as instances of such faulty legitimization.
Emerging notion of participatory constitutionalism for ensuring social inclusion, public participation and national ownership in the constitution-making process. Constitution-making in post-conflict societies has been well recognized as a process-based substantive constitutional right. The experiences of South Africa, Kenya, and Rwanda have demonstrated that public engagement in constitution-making is vital for the ownership of the drafted constitutional text by the people; especially those excluded and marginalized groups. Failure to engage the people in the process may cause a revival of conflict, as in Liberia, Haiti and Sri Lanka. Nepal has constituted a massive and inclusive Constituent Assembly of 601-elected members to formulate a new Constitution, with sufficient representation of diverse groups, including indigenous nationalities (janajatis), Dalits, Madhesis, and nearly 191 women. Based on the South African and Kenyan experiences, Nick Haysom, former legal advisor of Nelsen Mandela, suggested several benchmarks (such as, majority support to the process and product, inclusiveness, transparency, participation, educative, facilitative of nation-building, and adequate time for the process) at a conference in Kathmandu. He considered these issues important in evaluating a constitution-making process, particularly, but not limited to conflict-ridden societies. He correctly said, "It is not ultimately the lawyers and the politicians who will man the barricades to protect the Constitution if it comes under attack- it will be the people and they will only do this if they feel a commitment to it." For many, constitution-making is an opportunity for nation building and consolidating the unity amongst diverse communities and groups, and such opportunities have been lost by some countries due to unnecessary external interventions.
Formulation of Fundamental/Essential Constitutional Principles. Eight objective resolutions were passed in December 1947 by the Indian Constituent Assembly as guiding principles for the drafting committee; political leaders felt such standards were essential before starting the drafting process. In absence of expressed immutable principles, the Supreme Court in India decided to derive 'basic structures' of the Constitution from the text as immutable through judicial pronouncements. But importance of the fundamental constitutional principles reached its height only when the South African constitution makers incorporated 34 principles in the Interim Constitution itself as fundamental and mandatory for the Constituent Assembly to comply with while drafting a new Constitution for the Republic of South Africa (1993-1996). These principles were enforceable by the Constitutional Court. In some countries where the UN played a key role (as in Namibia) the UN Security Council reviewed the draft Constitution before it came into effect. According to one USIP/UNDP report, in one-third of the constitution writing exercises completed during the period 1975-2003, a set of irreversible principles were developed by each country as conceptual terms of reference with which the final draft had to comply in order to secure ratification. Many modern constitutions have now started incorporating fundamental principles in the Constitution itself. Pressures are building on political parties and Constituent Assembly members in Nepal to agree on minimum 'fundamental constitutional principles' as their terms of reference for drafting a new democratic Constitution for Nepal. Some scholars have already suggested 'restructuring of the state, which appears in several places of the Interim Constitution, to be the most important principle'. A major responsibility of the state, as stated in the Preamble and Article 33 (d) of the Nepalese Interim Constitution, is to ' carry out an inclusive, democratic and progressive restructuring of the State by eliminating its existing form of centralized and unitary structure in order to address the problems relating to women, Dalits, indigenous tribes, Madhesis, oppressed and minority community and other disadvantaged groups by eliminating class, caste, language, sex, cultural, religious and regional discriminations'. Since the Constituent Assembly is the manifestation of the Jana Andolan (people's movement) in Nepal, it is not unreasonable to argue that these goals have the status of the fundamental constitutional principles and bind the Assembly.
Issues and Options
The progressive development of modern constitution-making as an essential process of negotiations to resolve conflicts and establish peace is well-recognized. While drafting six constitutions in six decades since 1948, Nepal has never implemented participatory exercises in negotiating constitutional provisions that would best reflect the aspirations of the common people. Like most countries in the world, constitution-making has remained an elite-dominated process in Nepal up until now. The emphasis made in recent years on ownership and participatory process has encouraged people to be prepared to contribute to the Constituent Assembly-led consultation exercises for producing an agreeable constitutional text. Recognition and acceptance of the inclusive process as a substantive right of the people is a welcome development-so too is the innovation of formulating 'immutable constitutional principles' as guidelines for the constitution makers.
There are some serious issues of concern in emerging constitutional trends that need immediate attention of the legal community. One main contentious issue is related to the legitimacy of the expansion of UN jurisdiction to run a transitional government in a regime-change situation, based on the Security Council Resolution and Peace Accord. An act of replacement or amendment of a national Constitution by provisions of Peace Accords signed on foreign soil by non-citizens of the country concerned, is an extra-constitutional move, and is very difficult to recognize as universally acceptable under constitutional jurisprudence.
Many Cambodians have reservations about accepting the Cambodian constitutional experiment as successful. For some scholars, the UN experiment of UNTAC in Cambodia was an utter failure and financially outrageous. So is the case of Iraq. In order to get rid of the financial burden and cover up its inability to establish constitutional order under the newly promulgated Constitution, according to many local politicians, the UN Authority unduly engineered the concept of Co-Prime Ministers, simply because the losing party (Cambodian People's Party) threatened to dislodge the leader of the winning party, Prince Ranaridh, from his seat of power. The elected government was forced to leave the country when the coalition partner staged a coup and assassinated several officials including a Minister. Had the threat of the revival of conflict in 1997 after the coup not been skilfully handled by the diplomatic community, Cambodia would have plunged into another round of violence and armed conflict, as it had happened in Liberia in 1995-2003.
The Constitutional system has not yet taken its roots in Cambodia, and the issue of impunity is being half-heartedly addressed after a prolonged delay through an extraordinary mixed tribunal. It is doubtful whether 'justice' will prevail in Cambodia to the satisfaction of the Cambodian people, especially those whose families were victimized during the period of genocide and civil war.
Expansion of external jurisdiction through a Peace Accord in Afghanistan and Liberia also can hardly be seen as success stories. In the case of Liberia, the authority of the signatories of the Accra Accord signed in August 2003 to amend and suspend several provisions of the Liberian Constitution to restructure the government system for the transitional period is a repetition of the Cambodian outcome.
The constitutional legitimacy of the restored and politically restructured Parliament in Nepal, to replace the old Constitution of 1990 by an Interim Constitution in 2007, and allowing the Interim Legislature-Parliament to overtake the mandates granted to the sovereign Constituent Assembly, has been repeatedly questioned in Nepal.
The challenge before transitional states is therefore to reconcile the contradictions of the national need to restore peace and to expand jurisdiction-based constitutional order on one hand, and harmonize the benefits of evolving constitutional jurisprudence, such as participatory (and inclusive) constitutionalism and immutable constitutional principles, on the other hand. In addition, these new developments have unduly empowered and legitimized the human rights unfriendly actions of new political forces whose democratic credentials have yet to be tested, at a time when traditional institutions of democracy and rule of law have been severely weakened during conflict.
Nepal hopes to see the elected and inclusive Constituent Assembly represent the people as an effective forum for deliberating important issues and negotiating resolutions at the national level, by providing additional impetus to the evolving tool of participatory constitutionalism. But this may not prevent the onslaught of power and resource-supported constitutional invasions in post-conflict societies, as experienced in other countries, unless a mechanism is put into place to address the problem of transplanting national constitutions.
The time has come for a forum like LAWASIA to undertake the responsibilities of examining and assessing the emerging practices of post-conflict constitutional jurisprudence, both substantive and procedural, before it is too late.
Prepared for 21 st. LAWASIA Conference (29 October -1 November 2008) by Dr. Surya Dhungel, a former law professor and senior Supreme Court Lawyer from Nepal, and Senior Partner of Nepal Consulting Lawyers, Inc. He has also served the United Nations in Cambodia and Liberia, both post-conflict societies, for seven years, respectively as Chief of the Legal Assistance Unit of UNOHCHR and Rule of Law Adviser (Human Rights) at United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) between 1999 and 2006. For the past 18 months, he has contributed to the preparatory assistance project of UNDP- Nepal, to support the constitution building process as Senior Project Manager. He has also published books and featured articles on the Nepalese Constitution, specifically, as well as various contemporary legal issues.
For a harsh criticism of such phenomenon, refer to Noam Chomsky's Failed Sates: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy, 103-166 (Allen & Unwin, NSW, 2006)
Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish Nobel Laureate, uses the term 'soft-states' referring to vulnerable and fragile states in his famous books: The Asian Drama-An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations (1968) and The Challenge of the World Poverty (1970)
Dr. Surya Dhungel, "Danger of Revival of Conflict" in SPOTLIGHTWeekly Magazine (27 June - 4 July, Kathmandu, 2008)
KC Wheare, Modern Constitutions, Ch. 1 and 2( Oxford University Press, London 1966)
Nick Haysom, "Negotiating a Sustainable Political Settlement: Lessons from the South African Transition," Democratic Constitution Making: Experiences from Nepal, 105-117 (Eds. Bhattarai and Subedi, NESAC/IDEA, Kathmandu, 2007); Yash Pal Ghai, "Interim Constitution in the Constitution Making Process," Discussion Paper (Constitutional Advisory Support Unit/UNDP Nepal, 2008)
D. Conrad, "Constituent Power, Amendment and Basic Structure of the Constitution: A Critical Appreciation", 1-23, vol. 6 & 7 (Delhi L.R., 1977 & 1978); KC Wheare, Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth, 95 ff (Indian Print, New Delhi, 1960); Keshavnand Bharati vs. Kerala,AIR, 1973 SC, 1861; Indira Gandhi vs. Raj Narayan,AIR, 1975, SC, 3299
Rajeev Dhawan," Judicial Law-Making and 'Committed' Judges: Doctrinal Differences in the Supreme Court and a Recent Case", 24, Vol. 6-7 (Delhi L.R. 1977-1978); Justice Krishna Iyer, "The Judicial System: Has it a Functional Future in our Constitutional Order", 1 S.C.C. (1979); Also see, Paramanand Singh, "Bakke and Thomas: A Comparative Legal Analysis of Emerging Judicial Responses to the problem of 'Equality' and 'Compensatory Discrimination' in USA and India", 48 Delhi L. R., Ibid.
British Constitutional Reform Act, 2005 to be implemented from 2009. See also, Rodney Brazier, Constitutional Practice, 2 nd. edn.,1-5 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994); In three leading Parliamentary Dissolution Cases- I, II, and III of Nepal, between 1993 and 1996, the Supreme Court of Nepal entertained the references of British, Australian, Indian, and Pakistani constitutional practices and case laws with regard to parliament dissolutions in Nepal. In India, the concept of basic structure was the gift of the judiciary propounded by justices in the famous Keshavanad Bharati vs. Kerala case (1973),Ibid.
Monitoring of the implementation of human rights treaties by UN international human rights bodies (Charter bodies, treaty bodies and other UN bodies like General Assembly, Economic and Social council, and ICJ) and Regional Bodies (European Court of HR, African Commission on Human and People's Rights, Inter-American Courts of HR), including ICC and international organizations like ICJ, ICRC, AI, Human Rights Watch and ILA. Ruling of the UN Human Rights Committee on a case of leaders of the Mikmaq tribal society in Marshall vs. Canada (CCPR/C/43/D/205, December 1991), rights of the Mikmaq people to participate in the public affairs under Article 25 (a) of ICCPR have been recognized. It has been further reinforced later in 1996 in a textual authority: "Citizens also participate directly in the conduct of public affairs when they choose or change their constitution". Also see, Vivien Hart, "Democratic Constitution Making" (Special Report of USIP on Constitution Making, 2002-2003)
Cambodia was the first country to venture for this experiment in 1991 through United National Transitional Authority (UNTAC) followed by Afghanistan, East Timor, Iraq etc. See: Articles 2, 12-14, and 18 of Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (Paris, 23 October 1991) and HWR Wade, "The Basis of Legal Sovereignty", 172 Cambridge L.J. (1955); Rohan Edrisinha, "Conflict and Constitutional Process: Some Sri Lankan Experiences" in Democratic Constitution Making, 133-138 (NESAC/IDEA, Kathmandu, 2007).
Robert Zoellick, "Modernizing Multilateralism", The Kathmandu Post ( October 18, 2008, Kathmandu)
Yash Pal Ghai, "Sharing Experiences on the Causes of Constitutional Failure and Participatory Constitution Making Process," Future of the Nepalese Constitution, 3-24 (Eds. Bhandari and Karki, Law Associates Nepal, Kathmandu, 2005)
HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 97 (Oxford University Press, London 1961); In Kelsen's term 'Grundnorm' for the ultimate source of authority.
Cambodian Agreement for Political Settlement, Ibid; The States participating in the Paris Conference on Cambodia, were, namely, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Republic of India, the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Jennifer Winder, "Constitution Writing & Conflict Resolution", (USIP/UNDP Study Report, 2004)
Ibid.
Comprehensive Peace Accord on Liberia signed in Accra in August 2003.
Peace Accord of Cambodia (Paris 1991); Three Separate Agreements on East Timor (Signed in 1999); Boon Agreement (December 2001); Accra Accord on Liberia (August 2003) and Peace Accord on Nepal (Kathmandu 2006); Also see, Comprehensive Peace Accord (21 November 2006) and Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (8 December2006), respectively under Schedule 4 and Schedule 5 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007. In case of Liberia, United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was heavily involved in providing all technical and logistic support to the Liberian Election Commission in 2006 for presidential election.
Vivien Hart, "Democratic Constitution Making" (Special Report/USIP, USA, 2004). Internet. See also, Yash Ghai, "Participatory Process for Making a New Constitution", Discussion paper (CASU/UNDP, Kathmandu, 2008); Vivien Hart, "Owning the Constitution: A Path to Peace ?", Fellow Project Report
Surya Dhungel, "Danger of Revival of conflict..." SPOTLIGHT Weekly Magazine, ibid.
Nick Haysom, "Comparative Experience: Constitution Making in Post-Conflict Societies", 8-11 Constitution Making in Nepal (Conference Report, CASU/UNDP, Kathmandu, March 2007); Surya Dhungel, "Revival of Conflict and Authoritarianism in Post-conflict Situations", 116-120 Lumbini Judicial Mirror, Issue-3 (Appellate Court Bar Association, Butwal, Nepal, August 2008).
Jonathon Morrow, " Iraq's Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost", USIP Special Report, No. 155 (December 2005); Christina Caan, "What Have We Learned from Iraq and Afghanistan ", (USIP Briefing, 22 April 2005); Ray Salvatore Jennings, "The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq", Peaceworks No.49 (Peaceworks, May 2003); Yash Ghai's Background Paper on the Constitution Making Process, 34 Constitution Making in Nepal, Appendix-1, Ibid
H.Conrad, "Constituent Power...", Ibid
Constitution Making in Nepal , 40 (Conference Report, CASU/UNDP, Kathmandu, 2007)
Jennifer Winder, Ibid.
Articles 8 to 12 of the Ethiopian Constitution have incorporated fundamental constitutional principles.
Surya Dhungel, 5 The Himalayan Times ( 13 August 2008, Kathmandu)
Yash Ghai's Background Paper on the Constitution Making Process, Ibid
Based on the Author's personal interactions with local politicians during his assignment in Cambodia (1999-2004).
