In recent times, the British Gurkhas have been in the news in most of the British and Nepali mainstream media for their military ‘kinship’ tie to Britain and their recent legal and political activities like seeking settlement rights in the United Kingdom. The British Gurkhas have a pension case in the European Court of Human Rights, in which they seek their right to a pension equal to that of their British counterparts.

According to the Ministry of Defence, Britain wants to maintain a force of approximately 3,000 Gurkha soldiers in its military institutions. What is intriguing is that there seems to be no debate on other Gurkhas, they are the Singaporean, Bruneian and Indian Gurkhas. The Singaporean Gurkhas have been the backbone of homeland security of the most developed nation state in South East Asia since 1949. Today, the Singaporean government maintains a strength of approximately 2,000 soldiers (para-military). Brunei, a small but oil-rich kingdom in South East Asia, maintains a Gurkha Unit as an important part of its homeland security. The British Gurkhas and Singaporean Gurkhas take up security employment in Brunei as their second career option, after their retirement.

India is a home to the largest number of Gurkha soldiers, yet they are hardly spoken of or seen on television or in the news. India has about 55,000 Gurkhas, this number includes Indian domiciled men of Nepali origin such as men from Darjeeling, Dehradun and Sikkim. My anecdotal knowledge suggests that the number of Nepali men serving in the Indian National Army could be approximately 40,000.

Generally speaking, the Indian Gurkhas are extended the rights that any Indian soldier would enjoy. The British Gurkhas have been granted the right to settle in the United Kingdom since May 2009 only after a relentless campaign championed by actress Joanna Lumley and Lib Dem councillor Peter Carroll.  Unfortunately, no settlement rights are extended to the Singaporean and Bruneian Gurkhas. For example, the Singaporean Gurkhas would be treated like any foreigner, once they retire from their service – on average they serve twenty-five years. This policy has a devastating effect, particularly on the Gurkha children who are born and brought up in Singapore. They are educated in Singapore and their skills are honed for the first world economy. In most cases, they are unable to apply such skills once they are in Nepal, due to the Nepali language and cultural barrier. They struggle.

It seems the Nepali state and society are unable to help these foreign born and educated Nepali youths. Unfortunately, there are cases in which both Nepali state and society treat them as a problem. For example, these youths are told that they lack Nepali language skills, that they take on board too much foreign influence, that they are too engrained into the Gurkha culture, and so on.

My observation is that if the knowledge and skills that the Nepali people acquire from any first world economy are shared with people of the Himalayas, it would benefit all the parties concerned. For this to happen, the Nepali state has to take a proactive role and encourage its people to help the diasporic community as they attempt to adjust to their motherland’s culture.

As far as the Gurkha recruitment debate is concerned, it is questionable to die for another country. This comes from international relations theory; your friend’s enemy could be your friend. Following on from this, it is true that the Nepali men had nothing to do with Argentinians. However, due to the nature of the military role, Nepali men in the British army had to fight the South Americans. But I pose the question: does it have an effect at all on the sovereignty of the Nepali nation state? The answer could be ‘yes’ and ‘no’, depending on how one positions oneself on the nationalism debate, a topic beyond the scope of this article. Importantly, it would be illogical to assume that the Nepali people love fighting. They died initially for British India and later for Britain’s cause, which was the best choice that they had at the time. In fact, the existing knowledge suggests that the Nepali rulers used the Gurkhas as a bargaining tool. On the other hand, it could be argued that British India ‘bribed’ the Rana regime by offering Europeans goods, for which thousands of Nepali men had to pay with their lives, especially in the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and in the great wars.  60,000 Nepali men are believed to have died for Britain’s cause.
The contemporary Nepali politicians seem to like to talk about the Gurkha issues which previous generations of Nepali leaders failed spectacularly to address. I, however, wonder whether these so-called politicians are aware of the fact that they are meddling with the lives of approximately 45,000 serving Gurkhas globally and the lives of the Gurkhas’ wives and children who could number as many as 100,000. Additionally, the Nepali leaders need to consider the lives of more than 300,000 Gurkha pensioners and the benefits that their families are entitled to.

Most important of all, do Nepali politicians know what Nepali people, particularly the Gurkha community want? Can they ensure that such a politically and economically pathetic Nepali state can employ members of the half-a-million-strong Gurkha community whose lives depend on foreign currency?  When I interacted with Gurkhas in particular and other Nepalese people in India, Singapore and in the UK, most of them thought that the idea of shutting down Gurkha recruitment is theoretically attractive from the nationalist perspective. Unfortunately, when the push and pull employment factors in the foreign army are considered, the Gurkhas and most of the Nepali diaspora seem to think that shutting down Gurkha recruitment would be problematic. The Gurkhas, who think Nepali men should fight for Nepal, know the opportunities that they have in Nepal. The Gurkhas seem equally aware of the Western notion of warrior identity in addition to local Lahure culture.  Interestingly, most of the Nepali diasporic community believe that effective regulation of the Nepali workers in the Gulf countries and Malaysia could be prioritised over making any changes to the Gurkhas. In other words, the Nepali government should sort out the mess that the Nepalese migrant workers in the Gulf countries and elsewhere face every day before making any changes to the existing Gurkha recruitment policy.

The Nepali people would benefit from having proper treaties with the respective countries in place, where the Gurkha military institution exists, rather than branding its hardworking peoples ‘mercenary’, which they are not, as I have argued elsewhere on this issue.  Perhaps the Nepali government could regulate local recruiting agencies to ensure that Nepali youths are not exploited. Additionally, the state could assist these potential recruits, who sustain physical injuries while competing to get selected into their choice of foreign army, by working with the respective recruiting authorities. Indian Gurkha recruitment is generally carried out on Indian soil which is very expensive for potential Gurkha recruits. It would benefit men from the mountain villages if the Indian Gurkha recruitment would be conducted in Nepal like the Singaporean Gurkha and British Gurkha recruitment processes. This could be possible if the Nepali state cooperated with the recruiting authorities of India, Singapore and the UK.

Moving beyond colonialism is a fascinating post-modern idea and I applaud it, but when there is no fulfilling challenge available to engage the Nepali youth, it is human nature for them to look for something to cling onto. Until the Nepali state is capable of containing its vibrant energy, I would tend to think that serving in the Gurkhas is not a bad option. After all, nobody seems to brand the commonwealth soldiers in the British army ‘mercenary’, even though they are not from the UK like their Nepali counterparts.  The Gurkha culture is closely intertwined with Nepali identity, almost to the level of the Himalayas and the origins of Buddhism. In fact, Gurkha identity often supersedes Nepali identity in the Western context, similarly Bahadur identity in India. Thus, is it reasonable to cast aspersions on the Gurkha way of life?

It is a general global trend that the youth of the contemporary generation like the idea of gaining foreign experience. Unfortunately, Nepali youths are restricted from taking on one year working programme abroad, beyond India. In such a situation, it is rational for any Nepali citizen to take up the job opportunity as a Gurkha soldier in the elite military regiments in the foreign countries. It appears to me that the Nepali nation state could avert a conflict in Nepal only by engaging or exporting the energy of its youth. Therefore, it is time to stop meddling with Gurkha recruitment processes rather, it would be better to ensure that overseas Nepalese citizens are not exploited. Like any members of the Nepalese diaspora, I would love to see these brave men working in Nepal when the Himalayan economy becomes healthy and sufficient job opportunities open up for thousands of overseas Nepali migrant workers. I would recommend that the contemporary Nepali leaders at the corridor of political power think rationally and sensibly, and pursue practical approaches rather than acting emotionally for the sake of nationalism. My analysis comes from my long term interactions with fellow countrymen, who are away from their beautiful mountain homes, leaving their love ones behind, through no choice of their own.  Unfortunately, either it was and still is the best option available for them or it has become embodied in Nepali culture.  For this reason, at least for now, let them enjoy their bread and butter wherever it may have come from. Perhaps dhal bhat is more important than nationalism; it does not mean they don’t love Nepal.

Gurung is a PhD candidate at the University of Edinburgh, UK. nepalnews.com January 29 2012