Obviously, the concerns and interests of India loom large in Nepal, but the inability of Nepal to successfully ally Indian apprehensions (and more generally the inability to correctly manage the Nepal-India-China triangle) can itself be understood as one of the main factors undermining Nepal’s capability to build a more meaningful partnership with China.

By Bhaskar Koirala

This year China will celebrate 60 years of the founding of the People’s Republic. Many aspects of China’s considerable achievements will be celebrated especially her foreign policy which has demonstrated a maturity and dexterity that is rather exceptional in today’s time. The view from Nepal is equally inspiring and starkly disappointing. China of course is a close friend of Nepal and a neighbor as well; we share history dating back thousands of years and key landmarks of this relationship continue to dot the modern period too. Nepal and China are exceptionally close in geographical terms yet the significance of this latter point is largely underestimated and worse, under-utilized.     

Nepal recognizes and appreciates the enormous advances made by China in almost every field; the successful holding of the Olympics and the string of achievements in China’s space program are only the most striking. Yet as a Nepali one is disappointed with the sluggish pace at which Nepal-China relations appear to gain momentum. The reason for this state of affairs is somewhat difficult to comprehend. There are likely many factors impinging on this question. The reality is that there has been no serious strategy as to how Nepal should execute its relations with China. Ad hoc arrangements have been the norm though it is obvious that this relationship cannot be taken for granted nor allowed to vacillate in limbo    

Obviously, the concerns and interests of India loom large in Nepal, but the inability of Nepal to successfully ally Indian apprehensions (and more generally the inability to correctly manage the Nepal-India-China triangle) can itself be understood as one of the main factors undermining Nepal’s capability to build a more meaningful partnership with China. China has also been confounded in her efforts to promote this important bilateral relationship, primarily due to continued instability in Nepal which does not bode well in fact for the seldom articulated Nepal-India-China triangle, a triangle which has security implications for Asia and much beyond, besides containing the elements of great economic potential.

The enormous changes in Nepal following the end of Monarchy have produced a multitude of political upheavals: the rise of ethnic-based politics and parties and the consequent articulation of rather complex concepts related to federalism and power sharing; a human rights and constitution building discourse that have taken advantage of expert views from home and abroad based on experiences from around the world. It would appear that these issues should logically be ensconced within a larger discussion and formulation of national interest and sovereignty. However, this does not appear feasible without an effort to debate these questions within the context of foreign policy, and more precisely a foreign policy that focuses specifically on India and China. Not only because these two countries are currently ascendant in global politics but quite simply because they are our neighbors.

The dynamics of India and China in the theater of Nepal are complex, multifaceted, and not amenable to simple characterization. There is undoubtedly an element of competition between the two countries as it concerns this erstwhile Himalayan Kingdom, but concomitantly there is also an underlying recognition that without some degree of cooperation in Nepal, neither country’s security and stability can be guaranteed over the long term, nor can economic exchange be promoted to a much larger degree. It is in this context that I wish to suggest that our Constituent Assembly should move forward with a purposeful debate that synthesizes Nepal’s foreign policy options via-a-vis India and China with the decisions pertaining to domestic governance and development that are being chalked out.

These days the Constituent Assembly itself has been obstructed over long periods of time and this is of course a matter of great concern, but ultimately this is the body that will shape the future of Nepal. At no other time in history has the course of politics in Nepal been orchestrated more forcefully by the people themselves than during the current period. It is therefore incumbent on the people of Nepal to continue to move ahead in whatever fashion is necessary, whether the CA is stalled or not. The purpose of this short exposition is therefore to propose that a mechanism be established to pursue a Track II Dialogue on Nepal-China issues that would run parallel to the official channel. Doing so would ensure that precious time is not squandered because planning in a bilateral relationship (and in diplomacy more broadly) is time consuming if nothing else.

Track II dialogues are typically utilized in circumstances where states which are more or less stable seek to address a particularly intractable problem of a bilateral nature. But the idea of pursuing a Track II mechanism in Nepal currently where its citizens are ostensibly more empowered that they will ever be (though in a milieu of overall instability) is not a bad one particularly given the importance of Nepal and China to one another and to the promotion of more broad SAARC-China relations.

Such a Track II dialogue between China and Nepal could take up a number of very important issues. To begin with, a discussion on the exact terminus point of the Tibet Railway in orientation to the Nepalese border could be at the top of the agenda because Nepal in fact has done very little homework on this topic. For instance, once this railway arrives at the Nepal-China border, does Nepal intend to plug into it at a single point or will this railway in future traverse Nepal at multiple points from north to south? What about the creation of an independent Nepal Railway Authority, something which the Nepal Ministry of Physical Planning and Works has already suggested is highly imperative? Why not establish a more informal arrangement for the time being that begins to interface immediately with relevant Chinese authorities? What sort of technical and other mechanisms has China put in place to execute the railway to the Nepal border? Obviously there is the issue of compatibility: Nepal has never really had a railway system but it must prepare for one based on the sort of technical framework already present in China and also in India.

Other important questions that may be addressed by a Nepal-China Track II dialogue are Nepal’s interest in gaining Observer status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Nepal’s participation in the annual Boao Forum in Hainan Province which has till now been ineffective at projecting Nepal in the larger Asian stage, climate change and its implications in the Himalayas, cross-border banking, and so on and so forth. Nepal and China share a rich history dating back thousands of years. This history should be expanded and further animated as a way to promote not only bilateral relations but regional cooperation and pan-Asian stability.        
                            
(The author is a PhD candidate at Peking University and a Member of the China Study Center in Kathmandu.  Email: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it )

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