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Ultimately, it is in neither Nepal nor India’s long-term interest to sign agreements that will increase the already existing domestic “political trust deficit”. Honestly speaking, no treaty or long lists of assurances are likely to be implemented during this period of difficult political transition. Nor it is the mandate of any government during this transitional phase to sign or implement agreements having long-term implications or contentious in nature. By Dr. Som P Pudasaini
Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal will begin his New Delhi ‘goodwill’ sojourn on August 18 at a very shaky point in his tenure with the largest party in the Legislature-Parliament, Unified CPN-Maoist, waging a battle against the government both in the parliament and on the street and support from within the PM’s own party far from adequate. Nevertheless, a visit to India has become an almost inescapable ritual for our top leaders based both on their personal desires to be in New Delhi’s good books as well as due to the expectation of our most important neighbor. In most cases, building a minimum national consensus on serious issues and adequate preparations for negotiations remain a secondary concern. Consequently, most visits turn into opportunities for rubbing shoulders with senior Indian leadership, presenting a long list of requests and announcing assurances given by the host through fuzzy press releases or joint statements.
Periodic high level visits are, of course, important and have economic, diplomatic and political benefits, depending on the level of preparations and seriousness at both ends. However, in the context of visits by our prime ministers, be it by GP Koirala or Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’, only very few of the assurances are concretized and implemented for the Nepali people to feel its benefits. For its part, the Indian side is puzzled as to why the support it believes it has given for so long does not seem to garner adequate goodwill of the Nepali politicians and masses.
The problem lies on both fronts. Nepal-India relations are too important for both the countries, particularly for Nepal, to be taken lightly. On the part of Nepal, we must prioritize our request for support, doing sound analysis before preparing project lists and strengthen our follow-up and implementation mechanisms. Any serious treaty or agreement must be agreed to only after an open national debate that results in broad consensus. On the part of India, it must be more magnanimous in its support. Lesser interference on political affairs and greater commitment to socio-economic programs are likely to enhance its image among the general public and curtail anti-Indian sentiments.
In general, goodwill visits must be used for strengthening mutual goodwill while official or state visits are for serious business. Moreover, these visits must not only be one-way traffic to New Delhi. The ruling Indian prime minister must be encouraged to reciprocate. All Nepali PMs have made numerous trips to New Delhi in the past decade. All the while, no Indian PM has visited Nepal since IK Gujral’s visit in 1997.
Goodwill visits must be used for strengthening mutual goodwill while official or state visits are for serious business. Moreover, these visits must not only be one-way traffic to New Delhi. The ruling Indian prime minister must be encouraged to reciprocate. All Nepali PMs have made numerous trips to New Delhi in the past decade. All the while, no Indian PM has visited Nepal since IK Gujral’s visit in 1997. |
In this context, the argument PM Nepal puts forth is that India has already been benefiting on the irrigation, power generation and flood control fronts, having already built the Tanakapur and Sharada barrage before the 1996 treaty. He argues that any further delay will be “a loss to Nepal” (almost Rs. 45 billion per year from electricity generation alone, according to him). With regard to the remaining concerns, the argument is that the disagreements concerning the formation of a Pancheswar Commission, deciding on the location of the project headquarter (Kathmandu or Lucknow) and position of regulating barrage (Purnagiri or Rupaligadh) can be sorted out by the technical committee.
All in All, it is apparent that the coordination between the PM’s office and that of the FM is inadequate. Koirala is reported to be energetically pursuing the long agenda in New Delhi to leave a personal mark. PM Nepal’s focus, on the other hand, appears to be on getting Pancheswar moving. Meanwhile, the Indian side is reported to be concerned, among others thing, on the security of Indian investments, formalization of strip border maps and cross-border criminal activities. It would have been best for the country had the preparation been more adequate and based on timely consensus. Indeed, this would have only required two broad actions on the government’s part.
First, a clear agenda should have been jointly prepared by the MOFA and the PMO. Subsequently, the process of domestic consensus building could have been initiated and completed earlier. It is being attempted in the last minute now. The agreed agenda should then have been shared with New Delhi, formally or informally, and initial feedback from them obtained. Secondly, FM Koirala should then have visited India to obtain commitments on the requests. A reciprocal visit by Indian FM Krishna would have been adequate to clarify New Delhi’s concerns and finalize agreements. At the end of such a process, a visit by PM Nepal, who would have a clear vision of what is pragmatic, would have been possible.
It is now evident that matters will progress in a different manner. Even still, the PM’s visit, now just a few days away, can still be useful if Nepal focuses on three issues. First, stress the importance of bridging the enormous trade deficit Nepal faces with India. Second, pay adequate attention to reliving the daily suffering of people resulting from rising prices, load shedding and shortages. Thirdly, solicit Indian assistance in concluding the peace process, writing the constitution, strengthening security in the Tarai and preventing cross-boarder criminal activities. Fortunately, these issues are likely to get some practical attention.
Ultimately, it is in neither Nepal nor India’s long-term interest to sign agreements that will increase the already existing domestic “political trust deficit”. Honestly speaking, no treaty or long lists of assurances are likely to be implemented during this period of difficult political transition. Nor it is the mandate of any government during this transitional phase to sign or implement agreements having long-term implications or contentious in nature. The only few functions of the transitional government is to conclude ongoing peace process, write a new constitution by April 2010 and carry out the day-to-day functions required to run the state. The International community, including India, has also committed to the mandate. The PM and the FM must keep this in mind while soliciting support from New Delhi.(The author can be reached at: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it )
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